如果说2016年是反对全球自由秩序的一年，那么，2017年就是政治和经济领域自由开放秩序的支持者重新组合、准备战斗的一年，他们通常是加倍押注全球化。今年和可预见的将来，他们之间围绕意识形态的战斗将界定全球和各国国内的政治格局。If 2016 was the year of revolt against the global liberal order, 2017 was the year when the supporters of liberal openness — political and economic — regrouped and mobilised, often by doubling down on globalisation. This year and in the foreseeable future, the ideological battle between them will define global and domestic politics.
旧秩序的弱点是这样一种事实产生的结果，即由于过去几十年里发生的经济和文化变革常常没有得到好的管理，使庞大的人群感觉到，他们不再属于自己所生活的社会。The weakness of the old order is a function of that fact that, after decades of often mismanaged economic and cultural change, large groups feel they no longer belong to the societies in which they live.
最欢迎反自由民粹主义者的人群是，那些感觉到——或在民粹主义者的引导下感觉到——国家领导人不再为他们的利益服务的人群。因此，让“真正的人民”( real people)与一个制度或统治集团对抗的言论包括：唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)的“美国优先”( America first)（好像民主*党**人不是美国人）、马琳•勒庞(Marine Le Pen)的“被遗忘的法国人”(forgotten French)，以及奈杰尔•法拉奇(Nigel Farage)的“正派人”(decent people)。
The anti-liberal populists’ chief appeal is to those who feel — or whom they make to feel — that national leaders no longer work for their interest. Hence the rhetoric pitting “real people” against a system or establishment: the “America first” of Donald Trump (as if Democrats are not Americans), the “forgotten French” of Marine Le Pen, the “decent people” of Nigel Farage.
西方的“非自由运动”在兴起，因为他们承诺通过建立起与世界的壁垒来找回归属感。“让美国再次伟大”(making America great again)、“夺回我的国家”(taking my country back)和“收回控制权”(taking back control)都是这个意思。但他们并不是仅有的利用归属感问题的人。Illiberal movements are on the rise in the west because of their promise to restore belonging by erecting barriers against the world. That is what “making America great again”, “taking my country back” and “taking back control” all mean. But they are not the only ones dealing in belonging.
全球其他地方的非民主政权也在迎合人们的被遗弃感。他们指责西方民主造成的混乱给人民带来不安全感，他们承诺，让人民免受这种不安全感的困扰。这也是一种对归属感的承诺，在这种情况下，归属感是产生于秩序和可预见性。Undemocratic regimes elsewhere in the world, too, are fishing in the waters of feelings of abandonment. In their case, their promise is to protect people from the insecurity they blame on the chaos resulting from western democracy. This, too, is a promise of belonging, in this case belonging derived from order and predictability.
非自由主义者或非民主政权对归属感的承诺应该都没什么吸引力。但是，有足够多的人有不同的想法，使自由开放秩序处于守势。为了赢回失去的支持，我们必须展示，一个开放和自由的经济体系如何能够再次——像过去那样——让每个人都有归属感。换句话说，我们需要一个适当的、让人有归属感的经济体系，以及一系列实施它的政策。Neither the illiberal nor the undemocratic promise of belonging should be attractive. But enough people think differently to have put liberal openness on the defensive. To recover its lost support, we must demonstrate how an open and liberal economic system can again — as it once did — make everyone belong. We need, in other words, a proper economics of belonging, and a set of policies to implement it.
这意味着要解决无归属感的源头——不仅仅是过去的源头，还包括未来的源头，也就是说，不仅仅是不断上升的抽象的不平等，还包括深刻的经济变化带来的诸多不平等影响。在过去的40年里，自由民主经济体经历了一系列变革，使部分群体有充分的理由感到不再有归属感。That means addressing the sources of non-belonging — not just past ones but future ones. That means not so much rising inequality in the abstract, but the many unequal effects of deep economic changes. Over the past 40 years, the economies of liberal democracies have undergone transformations which have left some groups with good reasons to feel that they no longer belong.
首先，提高生产率——本身是一件好事——对制造业就业造成的打击比对服务业更大。这是做一个简单的算术就能明白的事实，如果每个工人能够生产更多的物质产品，那么生产同样数量产品需要的工人就会减少。First, improved productivity — in itself a good thing — hits manufacturing employment harder than services. It is an arithmetical fact that if each worker can produce ever more material goods, then ever fewer workers are needed to produce the same amount.
所有发达国家都有过工厂就业人数大幅下降的经历。事实上，各国从工业社会鼎盛时期淘汰下来的典型的工厂工人——几乎没有接受过正规教育的人群——的境遇有天壤之别，这表明正确的政策并不是盲目痴迷制造业，而是让工人在其他领域找到更好的工作。这意味着通过更积极的总需求管理，辅之以对教育、技能和培训进行大量投资，确保其他领域的就业强劲增长。All advanced countries have seen huge drops in factory employment. The fact that they vary widely in the extent to which they have left behind the typical factory workers of industrial society’s heyday — men with little formal education — shows that the right policy is not to fetishise manufacturing but to make it more rewarding to leave it for other work. That means securing strong jobs growth elsewhere — through more aggressive aggregate demand management — coupled with big investments in education, skills and training.
其次，这些变化对不同地区产生的影响也不同。那些依赖于走下坡路行业的人可能会陷入恶性循环，而那些拥有最佳机会的人会转移到更有活力的地方。由于衰落的地方还是国家整体的一部分——不仅在经济层面，也包括社会层面——经济政策必须考虑到地域差异，因地制宜。Second, such changes affect different places differently. Those reliant on declining sectors risk being caught in a negative spiral as people with the best opportunities leave for more dynamic places. For places in decline to continue to belong to the nation as a whole — economically but thereby also socially — economic policy must be conscious of place, and be geographically directed.
这意味着：一要确保需求增长不仅要保证总量增长，而且要保证每个区域内部的需求增长；二要捍卫每个地区生产率提高的条件。第一点必须涉及转移支付和公共支出，其中转移支付不能以可能会制造贫困陷阱的方式与正在衰落的经济活动或以经济状况调查为基础的补助挂钩，而公共支出最好投向能够提升当地生产率和吸引力的基础设施上，将能够提振当地经济活动的人群吸引过来。第二点同样要求对基础设施进行公共支出，同时还要提供充分的商业融资渠道。具有（部分）非商业授权的金融机构——例如某些类型的社区银行——可以在这一过程中发挥重要作用。That means securing demand growth not just in the aggregate, but within each region, and it means safeguarding the conditions for improved productivity in each locality as well. The former must involve both transfers — but not linked to declining activities or means-tested in ways that create poverty traps — and public spending, ideally on the sort of infrastructure that helps a location’s productivity and attractiveness to the sort of people whose presence boosts economic activity. The latter means, again, public spending on infrastructure but also adequate access to business financing. Financial institutions with (partially) non-commercial mandates — such as certain types of community bank — could be important for this.
第三，经济的结构性变化对工会产生了影响，工业领域的工会势力一直是最强大的。对于最脆弱的群体——那些工会的集体代表作用对他们而言最为重要，那些最有理由认为，没有工会他们就会被抛弃，不得不自己照顾自己的人——来说，这是最糟糕的结果。让人有归属感的经济必须确保人人合理、平等地参与分享权力。Third, structural economic change has affected unionisation, always strongest in industry. That, in turn, is worst for the most vulnerable — those for whom it matters most to have collective representation and who most justifiably feel thrown aside to fend for themselves without it. An economics of belonging must be one that secures a reasonably equal participation in power.
第四，部分因上述变化导致的不平等加剧，也使得一些对归属感而言至关重要的需求成为许多人遥不可及的奢望。住房是最重要的例子，高质量的教育排在第二位。这是一种剥夺，对年轻人影响尤其大。政策解决方案必须针对这些商品的供给而非需求：一种为所有人提供住房和优质教育的公共责任。And fourth, the rise in inequality, caused in part by all these changes, has also served to put some things particularly important for belonging beyond the reach of many. Housing is the most important case, quality education is an important second. That is a kind of deprivation that particularly affects the young. The policy solution must involve the supply rather than the demand for these goods: a public responsibility for securing the provision of housing and quality education for all.
我们还可以列举出更多。但现在应该清楚的是，不平等的至少四类受害者——处于不利境地的缺乏技能的人员，依赖于错误经济活动的地区，几乎没有外部选择、没能力拒绝不佳选择的人群，以及年轻人——之所以遭受不平等，有共同的原因。这就是为什么让人有归属感的经济必须解决问题的根源，而不仅仅是问题的症状。这需要国家更积极地参与经济活动，而不是进行更多的再分配（但有时需要同时进行再分配）：指导、以及扩大和缩小总需求管理; 提供公共产品、建立机构来改善市场职能；以及纠正市场中的权力平衡。We could go on. But it should be clear by now that at least four dimensions of inequality — tilted against the unskilled, places relying on the wrong economic activities, those with few outside choices and the ability to turn down bad options, and the young — have common causes. That is why an economics of belonging must address the causes not just the symptoms. Rather than (but sometimes in addition to) more redistribution, this calls for a more active state involvement in the economy: in directing and scaling up and down aggregate demand management; in the provision of public goods and institutions to improve market functioning; and in redressing the power balance in the market.
但是，这并不一定意味着我们要建立一个更大的政府。而是意味着国家应该随时作好出手干预的准备，让市场的发展——例如通过数字化实现就业转型——更好地运行。在再分配政策发挥重要作用的领域，再分配对其他因素所产生的影响比再分配的规模更重要。全民基本收入(universal basic income)与合理的基础设施支出相结合，在保持衰落地区可持续发展方面的效果，可能要好于战后常见的向工业行业全职职工提供的以经济状况调查为基础的传统福利。同样，旨在惩罚市场力量集中或囤积社会重要商品（如住房和优质教育）的税制（例如财富税）比我们现在的税制要好。But none of this necessarily implies a bigger state. It rather means the state should be readier to intervene to make market developments — such as the transformation of work through digitisation — work better. Where redistributive policies matter, it is less in how much they redistribute than in how the redistribution affects these other things. A universal basic income combined with smart infrastructure spending may do a better job of sustaining declining places than the common postwar structure of means-tested welfare benefits traditionally premised on full-time industrial jobs. Similarly taxation designed to penalise the concentration of market power (such as a wealth tax) or the hoarding of socially crucial goods such as housing and quality education is better than what we have now.
这些建议合在一起就组成了一个激进的一揽子计划，不过，为了让每个人在自由、开放的经济体系中都找到归属感，这个一揽子计划是必要的。另一种选择不是没有这激进，而是属于非自由或非民主的激进主义，或二者兼有的激进主义。Such proposals add up to a radical package, but one necessary to make everyone belong in a liberal, open economy. The alternative is not something less radical, but a radicalism that is illiberal, undemocratic, or both.