俄罗斯的繁荣生意走向衰落Russia’s Boom Business Goes Bust
莫斯科的*器武**出口已经下降到自苏联解体以来从未见过的水平。 Moscow’s arms exports have fallen to levels not seen since the Soviet Union’s collapse.
在2010年代初达到顶峰之后，俄罗斯的*器武**出口已经下降到苏联解体以来的水平。华尔街日报》将俄罗斯*器武**出口的急剧下降称为 "俄罗斯在乌克兰战争中的伤亡 "之一。 After cresting in the early 2010s, Russian arms exports have fallen to levels not seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Wall Street Journal referred to Russia’s precipitous decline in arms exports as among “the casualties of Russia’s war in Ukraine.”
1992-2022年俄罗斯*器武**出口， 以趋势指标值衡量，这是衡量军事*器武**和系统的经济价值的标准单位。
但时间上并不吻合： 根据斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所的数据，俄罗斯的*器武**出口从2019年开始认真下降，相对于2011年俄罗斯*器武**工业的高水位，已经下降了近20%。 那一年，俄罗斯的*器武**出口几乎与美国的*器武**出口相当，并交付给35个不同国家。11年后，俄罗斯的*器武**出口下降了近70%，只交付给12个国家。 But the timing doesn’t add up: According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia’s arms exports began falling in earnest in 2019, and were already down nearly 20 percent relative to 2011, the high-water mark for the Russian arms industry. That year, Russian arms exports nearly matched U.S. arms exports and were delivered to 35 different countries. Eleven years later, Russian arms exports had fallen by nearly 70 percent, with deliveries to just 12 countries.
如果说乌克兰战争给俄罗斯的*器武**出口带来了敲门砖，那么该行业在一段时间内已经陷入困境。 If the war on Ukraine dealt the knockout blow to Russia’s arms exports, the industry had already been on the ropes for some time.
俄罗斯已经面临着巨大的、主要是自找的伤痛，*器武**销售的下降预示着该国在全球事务中的地位如何？他们指出，俄罗斯--俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔-普京--的国际影响力进一步削弱，对石油和天然气出口的依赖性越来越强。早在2015年，玛丽亚-斯涅戈瓦娅在《华盛顿邮报》上撰文，告诫 西方将俄罗斯 "视为一个普通的石油国家，而不是一个非同寻常的超级大国"。随着其国防工业的不景气，这一评估现在甚至比当时更真实。 Already facing substantial and largely self-inflicted wounds, what do Russia’s falling arms sales portend for the country’s position in global affairs? They point to further erosion of Russia’s—and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s—international influence and increasing dependence on oil and gas exports. Writing in the Washington Post, Maria Snegovaya admonished the West to think of Russia “as an ordinary petrostate, not an extraordinary superpower” back in 2015. With its defense industry in the doldrums, this assessment is even more true now than it was then.
也许最重要的是，*器武**销售的下降表明莫斯科越来越依赖并服从于印度和中国的利益。俄罗斯现在比2003年以来的任何时候都更依赖对这两个国家的*器武**销售，但出口量要小得多，而且印度和中国都在继续发展自己的进口竞争性*器武**工业。 Perhaps most importantly, the decline in arms sales signals Moscow’s increasing dependence on—and subordination to—the interests of India and China. Russia is now more dependent on arms sales to those two nations than any time since 2003—but at much smaller export volumes, and with both India and China continuing to develop their own import-competing arms industries.
俄罗斯21世纪初的军备繁荣是由从中国、印度和 阿尔及利亚 --俄罗斯三个最大的出口市场--扩大购买规模以及向前苏联的 "新 "市场扩张所推动。前苏联的阿塞拜疆和土库曼斯坦在获得石油和天然气收入后，开始囤积俄罗斯的*器武**和*器武**系统，包括作战坦克、攻击直升机、地对空导弹和反坦克导弹。 Russia’s early-21st century arms boom was fueled by scaled-up purchases from China, India, and Algeria—Russia’s three biggest export markets—as well as expansion into “new” markets in the former Soviet Union. Flush with oil and gas revenues, former Soviet republics Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan began stocking up on Russian weapons and weapons systems, including battle tanks, attack helicopters, and both surface-to-air and anti-tank missiles.
但也正是在这个时候，俄罗斯开始扩大其作为修正主义和无赖领导人的首选出口商的角色，如委内瑞拉的乌戈-查韦斯和叙利亚的巴沙尔-阿萨德。2010年至2013年，随着美国、欧盟和其他国家对大马士革实施*器武**禁运，在叙利亚内战的前几年（和最激烈的战斗），俄罗斯对叙利亚的*器武**转让急剧增加。 But it was also around this time that Russia began expanding its role as an exporter of choice for revisionist and rogue leaders, such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Russian arms transfers to Syria spiked from 2010 to 2013 in the run-up to and first few years (and heaviest fighting) of the Syrian civil war as the United States, European Union, and others imposed arms embargoes on Damascus.
在俄罗斯*器武**销售强劲的十年后，2010年代中期出现了一些不利因素。委内瑞拉的经济在2014年陷入崩溃，叙利亚的*器武**采购也是如此。前十年飙升的油价被更低和更不稳定的价格所取代，遏制了来自石油资源丰富的邻国的需求。在俄罗斯吞并克里米亚之后，美国和其他西方国家开始向第三国施压，要求它们不要购买俄罗斯的产品。 After a decade of strong Russian arms sales, headwinds emerged in the mid-2010s. Venezuela’s economy cratered in 2014, as did Syria’s arms purchases. The surging oil prices of the previous decade were replaced by lower and more volatile prices, curtailing demand from oil-rich neighbors. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the United States and other Western countries began pressuring third countries not to buy Russian.
与此同时，俄罗斯在印度和中国的最大出口市场开始发生变化。在总理纳伦德拉-莫迪(Narendra Modi)的领导下，印度的*火军**工业受益于印度对本地采购的普遍支持，国内生产激增，进口下降。 At the same time, Russia’s biggest export markets in India and China began to change. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Indian arms industry has benefited from a general Indian pivot to local procurement that saw domestic production surge and imports fall.
中国2000年的经济繁荣促进了其军事工业综合体的发展和现代化，遏制了来自俄罗斯的进口，并作为*器武**出口国与俄罗斯竞争，特别是对发展中国家和中等收入国家。虽然中国仍然是俄罗斯的首要出口目的地，但总体而言，中国从俄罗斯的进口在2000年代后期开始消退。随着乌克兰战士报告在缴获或销毁的俄罗斯*器武**中出现越来越多的中国部件，这场战争似乎至少暂时扭转了先前的贸易流。 China’s 2000s economic boom facilitated the development and modernization of its military-industrial complex, curtailing Russian imports and competing with Russia as an arms exporter, especially to developing and middle-income countries. Though China remains a top Russian export destination, overall, China’s imports from Russia began receding in the late 2000s. With Ukrainian fighters reporting more and more Chinese components in captured or destroyed Russian weapons, the war appears to be at least temporarily reversing the earlier flow of trade.
*器武**销售的减少既是俄罗斯在全球事务中影响力减弱的症状，也是其原因。*器武**销售和实物军事援助是大国对外国政府施加影响的最有力的杠杆之一，有助于发展战略伙伴关系，并作为明确的交换型外交中的胡萝卜或大棒，例如美国对以色列和埃及的军事支持是达成《戴维营协议》的诱因。 Declining arms sales are both a symptom and cause of eroding Russian influence in global affairs. Arms sales and in-kind military aid are among major powers’ strongest levers of influence on foreign governments, useful for developing strategic partnerships and as the carrot or stick in explicit quid pro quo-based diplomacy, such as U.S. military support to both Israel and Egypt as an enticement to seal the Camp David Accords.
2010年，俄罗斯向37个国家出口了*器武**，包括欧盟成员国塞浦路斯和斯洛文尼亚，以及西半球国家巴西和墨西哥。这些*器武**出口反映了莫斯科在普京领导下，在经历了十多年的政治和经济不稳定之后，重新成为一个全球大国。 到2022年，俄罗斯的*器武**出口反映了其日益孤立：其91%的出口只流向四个国家： 印度、中国、白俄罗斯和缅甸--两个崛起的大国、一个附庸国和一个全球弃儿。 2010年代中期的逆风已经成为一场全面的大风。 In 2010, Russia exported arms to 37 countries, including EU members Cyprus and Slovenia, as well as Western hemisphere countries Brazil and Mexico. These arms exports reflected Moscow’s reemergence under Putin as a global power following more than a decade of political and economic instability. By 2022, Russian arms exports reflect its growing isolation: 91 percent of its exports flowed to just four countries: India, China, Belarus, and Myanmar—two ascendent powers, one vassal state, and a global pariah. The headwinds of the mid-2010s have become a full-blown gale.
俄罗斯作为*器武**出口国的地位不断削弱，这也增加了它对出口石油、天然气和其他商品，以及化肥和钢铁等相对低附加值出口的依赖。尽管俄罗斯是粮食和燃料市场的主要参与者，但它的财富随着商品价格的上升和下降而上升，就像其他出口国那样。此外，其将粮食和燃料出口*器武**化的倾向--这两点在乌克兰战争期间都有所表现--已经降低了其作为贸易伙伴的可信度。 Russia’s weakening position as an arms exporter also increases its dependence on exporting oil, natural gas, and other commodities, as well as comparatively low value-added exports such as fertilizer and steel. Although Russia is a major player in both food and fuel markets, its fortunes rise and fall with commodity prices such as those of other exporters. Moreover, its tendency to weaponize its food and fuel exports—both of which have been on display during the Ukraine war—has reduced its credibility as a trading partner.
在短期内，与战争有关的市场不稳定导致国库膨胀，稳定了受制裁和战争成本上升困扰的俄罗斯经济。但是，随着全球价格的缓和，俄罗斯的出口和政府收入正在减弱。欧洲正在学习在没有俄罗斯石油和天然气的情况下生活，或者至少是在大大减少俄罗斯石油和天然气的情况下生活，这给我们带来了俄罗斯*器武**销售下降的最重要影响：它对印度和中国的依赖性越来越强。 In the short term, war-related market instability resulted in burgeoning coffers, stabilizing a Russian economy beset with sanctions and the mounting costs of war. But as global prices moderate, Russia’s export and government revenues are softening. Europe is learning to live without—or at least with significantly less—Russian oil and gas, which brings us to perhaps the most important implication of Russia’s declining arms sales: its growing dependence on India and China.
在乌克兰战争和随之而来的西方制裁期间，印度和中国一直是俄罗斯的经济命脉。截至4月中旬，俄罗斯90%以上的海运原油出口到这两个国家，仅中国在2022年对俄罗斯液化石油的采购量就翻了一番。由于俄罗斯*器武**的其他出口市场也已枯竭，印度和中国现在在该领域所占的市场份额比过去20年的任何时候都大。 India and China have been Russia’s economic lifelines during the Ukraine war and resulting Western sanctions. As of mid-April, more than 90 percent of Russia’s seaborne crude oil exports went to the two countries, and China alone doubled its purchases of Russian liquefied petroleum in 2022. As other export markets for Russian arms have also dried up, India and China now command larger market shares in that sector than at any point in the past two decades.
而这些市场中的任何一个或两个都可以迅速改变。俄罗斯对印度的*器武**出口目前处于停滞状态，原因是新德里担心付款会触犯西方制裁，而且克里姆林宫不得不将*器武**转移到自己的*队军**。美国国防部并没有失去这个由制裁促成的让各国摆脱俄罗斯军事技术的机会。 And either or both of those markets can change rapidly. Russian arms exports to India are currently stalled due to New Delhi’s fears of payment running afoul of Western sanctions and because the Kremlin is having to divert arms to its own military. The sanctions-fueled opportunity to wean countries off of Russian military technology is not lost on the U.S. Defense Department.
随着流向传统贸易伙伴的*器武**减少，其产品的出口目的地减少，俄罗斯正在失去其对其他国家，特别是那些它可能与西方国家争夺影响力的国家的最佳和最有针对性的外交杠杆来源之一。事实上，美国已经加强了对印度的情报共享、军事援助和出口，以帮助其减少对俄罗斯*器武**的依赖，并作为华盛顿在亚洲平衡中国战略的一部分。 With fewer arms flowing to traditional trading partners and fewer export destinations for its products, Russia is losing one of its best—and most targetable—sources of diplomatic leverage over other countries, especially those countries where it might otherwise compete for influence with the West. Indeed, the United States has ramped up intelligence sharing, military assistance, and exports to India to help decrease its reliance on Russian arms and as part of Washington’s strategy to balance China in Asia.
从长远来看，中国将成为俄罗斯最重要的贸易伙伴，中国进口的汽车、工业机械和半导体已经取代了从欧洲的进口。但是，俄罗斯在进出口方面越是依赖中国，*器武**出口所应提供的战略自主权就越是受到侵蚀。 Over the longer term, China will emerge as Russia’s most important trade partner, with Chinese imports of automobiles, industrial machinery, and semiconductors having replaced imports from Europe. But the more Russia depends on China for exports and imports, the more the strategic autonomy arms exports are supposed to provide erodes.
乌克兰战争使俄罗斯的命运迅速逆转的可能性极小，原因有几个。首先，也是最明显的一点，俄罗斯的*火军**工业甚至跟不上国内的需求，因为俄罗斯正在消耗它的*器武**储备，并将长期停用的赫鲁晓夫时代的坦克重新投入使用。拥有军事工业综合体的全部意义在于能够从国内生产中为战争机器提供燃料；*器武**出口在供应战争努力方面处于次要地位。 The war in Ukraine makes a quick reversal of Russian fortunes extremely unlikely for several reasons. First and most obviously, the Russian arms industry isn’t even keeping up with domestic demand as Russia burns through its stockpile of arms and drafts long-mothballed Khrushchev-era tanks back into service. The whole point of having a military-industrial complex is to be able to fuel the war machine from domestic production; arms exports are taking a back seat to supply the war effort.
第二，西方的制裁正在限制俄罗斯*器武**工业所依赖的供应链。国际和战略研究中心最近的一份报告发现，西方的制裁给莫斯科带来了巨大的采购问题，特别是在半导体、夜视技术和航空电子设备领域。即使需求回升，也不清楚俄罗斯能否满足需求。 Second, Western sanctions are constraining the supply chains on which the Russian arms industry depends. A recent report by the Center for International and Strategic Studies found that Western sanctions have created massive sourcing problems for Moscow, especially in the areas of semiconductors, night-vision technology, and avionics. Even if demand were to rebound, it is not clear Russia could meet it.
最后，这场战争一直是俄罗斯军事技术的一个令人惭愧的展示。无头 "坦克的形象和俄罗斯导弹高故障率的报告可能部分是战时宣传，部分是现实。关注俄罗斯*器武**系统的技术缺陷可能会过度低估乌克兰部队的聪明才智和有效性。不管是什么原因，乌克兰战争对俄罗斯领先的军事技术来说并不是一个特别引人注目的广告。 And finally, the war has been a humbling showcase for Russian military technology. Images of “headless” tanks and reports of high failure rates for Russian missiles may be part wartime propaganda, part reality. Focusing on the technological shortcomings of Russian weapon systems may overly discount the ingenuity and effectiveness of Ukrainian forces. Whatever the reasons, the war in Ukraine has not been a particularly compelling advertisement for Russia’s leading-edge military technology.
随着乌克兰战争的持续，俄罗斯正在变得--从某种程度上说--比其入侵后立即变得更加孤立。除了与中国和印度的贸易关系外，俄罗斯与从哥斯达黎加到印度尼西亚和土耳其等国的贸易也在增加。但是，作为各国建立联盟、扩大和保护其利益的核心工具，俄罗斯的*器武**出口却急剧减少了。乌克兰战争和随后的制裁将俄罗斯落后的*器武**出口推到了聚光灯下，但这些问题已经积累了近十年，而且没有一条明确的路径来扭转这一趋势。 As the Ukraine war drags on, Russia is becoming—by some measures—less isolated than in the immediate aftermath of its invasion. In addition to trade relations with China and India, Russia’s trade with countries ranging from Costa Rica to Indonesia and Turkey has increased. But its arms exports, a core tool by which countries build coalitions and extend and protect their interests, have waned dramatically. The Ukraine war and subsequent sanctions have thrust Russia’s lagging arms exports into the spotlight, but the problems had been accumulating for almost a decade—and there isn’t a clear path toward reversing the trend.
点评：
受俄乌战争影响，美国在全球*器武**出口中的份额从往年的33%激增到去年的40%，而俄罗斯的份额则从2018年的22%下降到2022年的16%。俄制*器武**最大的进口国印度的购买量下降了37%，而其他7个主要进口国家的购买量平均下降了59%。
许多国家不再进口或减少进口俄罗斯*器武**主要是基于三个原因： 1、在乌克兰战场看到了俄罗斯*器武**的低劣技术含量。 2、避免跟声名狼藉的俄罗斯做生意。 3、不相信在目前的状况下俄罗斯还能及时交货。
（墨栩）