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今天小编为您带来期刊论文《Incentives and Emission Responsibility Allocation in Supply Chains》7. Concluding Remarks。
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Today, the editor brings “ Concluding remarks of the journal article 《Incentives and Emission Responsibility Allocation in Supply Chains》".
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内容摘要：Abstract
本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍期刊论文《Incentives and Emission Responsibility Allocation in Supply Chains》7. Concluding Remarks。
This issue's tweet will introduce the journal article 《Incentives and Emission Responsibility Allocation in Supply Chains》 from three aspects: mind mapping, detailed reading content, and supplementary knowledge, focusing on section concluding remarks.
思维导图：Mind mapping
精读内容：Intensive reading content
本小节对本文进行总结。首先介绍了本文的贡献：在本文中提供了一个方法上的贡献，以帮助合理化供应链中的二氧化碳排放，它占全球温室气体排放的20%以上。作者认为供应链具有主导领导者，他们有动力减少供应链中的污染，要么在碳税生效的环境中运作，要么实施内部碳定价体系。然后提出作者的建议，供应链领导者可以利用他们对其供应链中相关污染源的知识，并以一种足迹平衡的方式重新分配供应链内的排放。这相当于在整个供应链中重新分配碳税负担，并由供应链领导者来执行，以激励企业共同努力减少其“间接”排放。
This section summarizes the contribution and recommendations provided in the article. Firstly, the article presents a methodological contribution aimed at rationalizing carbon dioxide emissions in the supply chain, which account for over 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions. The authors argue that supply chains often have dominant leaders who are motivated to reduce pollution within the supply chain, either by operating in an environment where carbon taxes are in effect or by implementing internal carbon pricing systems. The authors propose that supply chain leaders can utilize their knowledge of pollution sources within their supply chains and redistribute emissions within the supply chain in a footprint-balanced manner. This essentially involves reallocating the burden of carbon taxes throughout the entire supply chain and having supply chain leaders enforce it to incentivize collective efforts to reduce their "indirect" emissions.
然后介绍了本文的研究内容：将重新分配问题表述为一个合作博弈，称为绿色博弈，并提出了绿色博弈的沙普利值作为一个分配供应链中总排放责任的方案。作者表明，当削减成本是私人信息时，沙普利分配激励了在明确定义的意义上是最优的削减努力。最后，通过对沃尔玛-诺蒂卡牛仔裤供应链的案例研究，提供了一个概念证明，其中背景就是结果。在方*论法**上，作者还举例说明了一个公理化的发展的效用，以确定理想的成本分担机制在供应链中。
The article then delves into its research content, which involves framing the redistribution problem as a cooperative game called the green game and proposes the Shapley value of the green game as a scheme for allocating total emissions responsibility within the supply chain. The authors demonstrate that when reducing costs is private information, the Shapley allocation incentivizes the optimal reduction efforts in a well-defined sense. Finally, through a case study of the Walmart-Nottex jeans supply chain, the article provides a conceptual demonstration, where the context serves as the backdrop for the outcomes. Methodologically, the authors also illustrate an axiomatic development of utility to determine an ideal cost-sharing mechanism within the supply chain.
其次作者介绍了未来的研究方向。首先责任的分配问题上，责任可能源于其他考虑。例如，最好让能源生产公司间接对其项目对下游污染的影响负责，让公司对其上游供应商的直接排放负责，或要求消费者内化用于生产其消费产品的供应链中温室气体污染的成本。其次，激励企业在供应链中增加减排工作的问题，可以在各种其他相关环境中进行研究。例如，有随机排放输出，或不完善或部分监测，或当有重复交互公司之间的供应链。
Next, the authors outline future research directions. Firstly, concerning the allocation of responsibility, it is suggested that responsibility may stem from other considerations. For instance, it might be preferable to hold energy-producing companies indirectly accountable for the downstream pollution impacts of their projects, hold companies accountable for the direct emissions of their upstream suppliers, or require consumers to internalize the costs of greenhouse gas pollution in the supply chains used to produce their consumption products. Secondly, the issue of incentivizing companies to increase emission reduction efforts in the supply chain can be explored within various other relevant environments. For example, in scenarios involving stochastic emission outputs, imperfect or partial monitoring, or when there are repeated interactions among companies within the supply chain.
最后，作者介绍了本文的一个关键方法贡献是定理3，它给出了保证参数化非合作对策中平衡作用的凹性的条件，从而推广了米尔格罗姆和罗伯茨（1990）的结果。
Finally, the authors highlight a key methodological contribution of the article, which is Theorem 3. It provides conditions for the concavity of equilibrium in parametrized non-cooperative games, thereby extending the results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
知识补充：Knowledge supplement
1、非合作对策 Non-cooperative strategies
非合作对策，是对所有局中人的决策思维做出一种假设而来考察的竞争决策模型，这种假设便是：局中人为所有的对手欲置自己于最不利，而通过对自己可行方案进行选择以求收益尽可能大。换句话说也就是在非合作对策中许局中人之间不相互合作，对策略的选取不允许事先有任何交换传递信息的行为，不允许订立任何强制性约定，每个局中人的目标也是希望自己得到尽可能多的支付，寻求一个对自己尽可能有利的策略。
Non-cooperative strategies are a competitive decision-making model that examines the decision-making mindset of all players in a game, assuming that each player assumes their opponents will act in a way that is most disadvantageous to them, and therefore selects their own feasible strategy to maximize their gains as much as possible. In other words, in non-cooperative strategies, players do not cooperate with each other, and the selection of strategies does not allow for any exchange or transmission of information in advance. No mandatory agreements are allowed, and each player's goal is to maximize their own payoff, seeking a strategy that is as advantageous to themselves as possible.
这种策略的选取，不能存在他人有可能失误的侥幸心理状态，必须是有把握的稳妥的理智行为。在非合作对策中，有利于一个局中人的分配并不一定不利于其他局中人。对于非合作对策，有较完善的理论基础——著名的Nash平衡点定理。它指出，任何非合作n人对策都存在唯一的平衡点，换句话说，是一个平衡局势。如果任何单个局中人，在其他局中人都要维持这一局势的情形下，都无法通过改变自身的策略使自己获利更多。
The selection of such strategies cannot be based on the possibility of others making mistakes, but must be based on assured, prudent, and rational behavior. In non-cooperative strategies, what benefits one player may not necessarily be detrimental to other players. Non-cooperative strategies have a solid theoretical foundation in the well-known Nash equilibrium theorem. It states that any non-cooperative game involving n players has a unique equilibrium point, in other words, a balanced situation. This means that if any single player cannot increase their payoff by changing their strategy while all other players maintain the equilibrium situation.
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参考资料：ChatGPT翻译、百度
本文由LearningYard学苑整理并发出，如有侵权请联系删除。
参考文献：[1] Gopalakrishnan S., Granot D., Granot F., et al. Incentives and emission responsibility allocation in supply chains [J]. Management Science, 2021, 67(7): 4172-4190.
文案|Whisper
排版|Whisper
审核|Wang