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今天小编为大家带来《政府介入情境下农业供应链金融演化博弈分析》一文。

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Today, the editor brings the "Game Analysis of Agricultural Supply Chain Finance Evolution under Government Involvement Scenario".

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1 内容摘要（Content summary）

今天小编将从“思维导图、精读内容、知识补充”三个板块，解读分享《政府介入情境下农业供应链金融演化博弈分析》一文的第五章多情境模拟-A情景模拟。

Today, I will be from the "mind map, read the content, knowledge supplement" three panels, interpretation and sharing of the "government intervention in the context of agricultural supply chain finance evolution game analysis" of the article in the fifth chapter of the multi-situation simulation - A scenario simulation

2 思维导图（Mind mapping）

3 精读内容（Intensive reading content）

3.1模型描述及其研究假设

3.1 Description of the model and its research hypotheses

以 A 企业现存“公司+农户”订单融资模式为依据，展开情境模拟：供应链金融合作模型涉及小农户、农业龙头企业两大主体。在供应链金融合作过程中存在博弈关系，双方博弈决策如下：小农户可以选择面向龙头企业“守信”或者“不守信” ，当小农户选择守信时，金融机构根据龙头企业的应收账款提供*款贷**，小农户支付一定利息，在此期间，龙头企业可将公司账款进行投资赚取收益；当小农户存在经营不善甚至诈骗信贷（所获信贷资金用于其他投资）等情况，则选择不履行订单合同，金融机构难以收回资金，将应收账款抛掷给龙头企业。面对金融机构，龙头企业策略选择集合（还款，不还款）。如果龙头企业选择代替农户还款，则短期内损失的机会成本即将该笔款项进行投资赚取的额外收益，因此龙头企业存在为了额外收益放弃还款的可能性。

Based on the existing "company + farmers" order financing model of Enterprise A, the situation simulation is carried out: the supply chain financial cooperation model involves two main subjects: small farmers and agricultural leading enterprises. In the process of supply chain financial cooperation, there is a game relationship, and the game decision-making of both sides is as follows: small farmers can choose to "keep faith" or "don't keep faith" for the leading enterprise, when small farmers choose to keep faith, the financial institutions will provide loans according to the accounts receivable of the leading enterprise, and small farmers will pay a certain interest, and the financial institutions will provide loans according to the accounts receivable of the leading enterprise. When small farmers choose to keep their word, the financial institutions provide loans based on the accounts receivable of the leading enterprises, and small farmers pay a certain amount of interest, and during this period, the leading enterprises can invest the accounts receivable of the company to earn income; when the small farmers have poor management or even fraudulent credit (the credit funds are used for other investments) and other situations, they choose not to fulfill the order contract, and the financial institutions have difficulty in recovering the funds, and the accounts receivable will be thrown to the leading enterprises. In the face of financial institutions, the leading enterprises strategy choice collection (repayment, not repayment). If the leading firm chooses to repay the loan instead of the farmer, the opportunity cost lost in the short run is the extra income earned from investing the money, so there is a possibility that the leading firm will give up the repayment of the loan for the sake of the extra income.

基本假设：

Underlying assumptions:

参数及其含义：

parameters and their meanings:

3.2 模型构建

3.2 Modeling

3.3演化稳定策略

3.3 Evolutionary stabilization strategies

4 知识补充（Knowledge supplement）

演化博弈分析的步骤是什么？（What are the steps in evolutionary game analysis?）

1.定义博弈模型：确定博弈参与者、策略空间和支付函数。策略可以是合作或背叛等不同行为选择。

1. Define the game model: identify the game participants, the strategy space and the payoff function. Strategies can be different behavioral choices such as cooperation or betrayal.

2.选择动态演化模型：选择适合研究的动态演化模型，如重复博弈、进化博弈等。不同的动态演化模型会对博弈结果产生影响。

2. Select the dynamic evolution model: select the dynamic evolution model suitable for the study, such as repeated games, evolutionary games, etc.. Different dynamic evolution models will have an impact on the results of the game.

3.计算策略演化：使用所选的动态演化模型，计算策略的演化过程。可以采用不同的演化算法，如复制动态、遗传算法等。

3. Calculate the strategy evolution: use the selected dynamic evolution model to calculate the strategy evolution process. Different evolutionary algorithms can be used, such as replication dynamics, genetic algorithms, etc.

4.分析稳定策略：研究博弈演化过程中出现的稳定策略或者纳什均衡点。稳定策略通常是不易被击败的策略，可以通过稳定性分析进行识别。

4. Analyze stable strategies: Study the stable strategies or Nash equilibrium points that appear during the evolution of the game. Stable strategies are usually strategies that are not easy to be defeated and can be identified through stability analysis.

5.模拟结果分析：分析模拟结果，包括策略演化图、合作比例随时间变化图等。可以从时间序列、平均效用、策略分布等方面进行分析。

5. Analysis of simulation results: analyze the simulation results, including the strategy evolution graph, the cooperation ratio over time, and so on. They can be analyzed in terms of time series, average utility, strategy distribution, etc.

6.敏感性分析：进行敏感性分析，研究不同参数值对博弈结果的影响。可以通过改变参数值，观察博弈结果的变化情况，从而更好地理解博弈过程。

6. Sensitivity analysis: conduct sensitivity analysis to study the impact of different parameter values on the game results. It is possible to change the parameter values and observe the changes in the game results, so as to better understand the game process.

7.结果解释和应用：解释模拟结果，探讨博弈参与者的行为和决策背后的动机。将模拟结果应用于实际问题，如社会合作、市场竞争等领域。

7. Interpretation and application of results: Interpretation of simulation results, explore the behavior of game participants and the motivation behind the decision. Apply the simulation results to practical problems, such as social cooperation, market competition and other fields.

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参考资料：Dpeel翻译

参考文献：

王静静.政府介入情境下农业供应链金融演化博弈分析[D].云南师范大学,2022.

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文字|Wei

排版|Wei

审核|呙升钧